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1. Introduction 
The outlines of Wittgenstein’s conception of propositions 
can be sketched by means of the following four or five 
points. First, in 1913 Wittgenstein focuses on whatever it is 
that judgments have in common that allows them to depict 
a sense and express a thought. In so doing Wittgenstein is 
pressing to find a sense or proposition – what is believed 
in -- of concern to logic and independent of psychological 
conditions like judging, asserting, and negating. In his 
1913 "Notes on Logic" Wittgenstein says (von Wright 
1979, 96): 
Judgment, question, and command are all on the same 
level. What interests logic in them is only the unasserted 
proposition. 
He writes, also:  
There are only unasserted propositions. Assertion is 
merely psychological. In not-p, p has exactly the same 
sense as if it stands alone; this point is absolutely fun-
damental. (von Wright 1979, 95) 
Second, to contend that assertion (etc.) is merely psycho-
logical and of no concern to the logician means that a 
proposition seeming to occur in assertion as though in 
another proposition does not, in fact, do so. That is, only 
truth-functional contexts provide a means for a proposition 
to genuinely occur in another proposition. Wittgenstein 
alludes to this contention when he writes that "at first sight 
it appears as if there were also a different way in which 
one proposition could occur in another” (von Wright 1979, 
143.)  
Third, it is essential to logic that when we concern our-
selves with propositions we take into consideration not 
merely the truth value that they have (true, false), but the 
truth value (true or false) they may possibly have. That is, 
logic highlights propositional bivalence. We can represent 
the false value by “~” or some other way, but what matters 
is not that we say “p is false” by (e.g.) ~p, but that we 
grasp that what matters to logic is both truth values. In 
English (once we settle that ~ p means “p is false”) we 
express that a proposition has two truth values by saying 
(or writing on a truth table) both p and ~ p. As our lan-
guage indicates, propositions are intrinsically linked to 
logical connectives, for as just noted, both/and, and not 
come into view simply by understanding the nature of 
propositions in terms of possible truth-values. About this 
bipolar view of the proposition Wittgenstein writes (Ogden 
1922, 95):  
In 'a judges p' p cannot be replaced by a proper name. 
This appears if we substitute "a judges that p is true and 
not-p is false." The proposition "a judges p" consists of 
the proper name a, the proposition p with its two poles, 
and a being related to both of these poles in a certain 
way. This is obviously not a relation in the ordinary 
sense. 
Wittgenstein is aware that language misleads us in our 
analyses of belief. The appearance noted above of our 
possessing more than one way of forming larger proposi-
tions out of smaller ones is one case; another is our 
tendency to mistake “A judges p” as a relation between an 
experiencing subject and the proposition (Ogden 1922, 
119). 
Fourth, Wittgenstein views the meaning of a proposition 
as a fact – its “objective” in Russell’s later language – that 
is, what makes it true. In particular, he insists that a true 
negative proposition (e.g. “Socrates is not a handsome 
man”) must be true because of some fact as to fail to do 
would leave our use of true negative propositions without 
meaning: 
However, for instance, "not-p" may be explained, the 
question of what is negated must have a meaning (von 
Wright 1979, 94). 
These items are surely not exhaustive of Wittgenstein’s 
conception of propositions and belief, but they will help us 
see more clearly into the development of Wittgenstein’s 
ideas to have them before us.  
2. A problem and a turning point 
Recall Wittgenstein’s point cited above:  
However, for instance, "not-p" may be explained, the 
question of what is negated must have a meaning. (von 
Wright 1979, 94) 
We can see some of the motivation behind this remark if 
we turn to an often ignored source, Russell’s chapter in 
Theory of Knowledge on the dual forms of belief and 
disbelief. Russell’s multiple relation analysis, given in his 
chapter on understanding, has captured the attention 
many interpreters and tended to eclipse this chapter which 
is my concern, though it is here, I think, that we gain entry 
into Wittgenstein’s views (as well as their affect on Rus-
sell). The relevant doctrine can be explained quite briefly. 
In the Theory of Knowledge Russell reduces belief that 
not-aRb to the form, disbelief that aRb (Eames 1984, 142). 
On this view (new to the text) what verifies (belief in) the 
negative proposition ~aRb is the truth of (a belief in) the 
positive proposition aRb. The purpose behind Russell’s 
introducing disbelief as a new form is to be able to assert 
that in belief and disbelief the same content, the same 
proposition, occurs.  
In taking this position on disbelief and belief, he may 
therefore be attempting, unsuccessfully, to address 
Wittgenstein’s demand for something common to various 
cognitive forms. But my present point is that Wittgenstein’s 
demand that there must be some fact of the matter is not 
satisfied by this reduction of negation to disbelief. In the 
Theory of Knowledge chapter under discussion Russell 
seems uncertain of the doctrine, and I think we can discern 
why, and what Wittgenstein may have said, from Russell’s 
own comments in 1918. In 1918, in the context of rejecting 
Demos’ alternative to his own doctrine of negative facts, 
Russell agrees with Demos that the reduction of ~aRb to 
disbelief in aRb is unacceptable (Slater 1986, 187). A 
negative proposition, Russell says, must be defined in 
such a way that its truth depends on something “in the real 
world” and not on the subjective event of experiencing 
disbelief; this is why, he suggests, there must be negative 
facts.  
The fact that mere weeks after composing the 1913 
dualist doctrine Russell replaces its account of true 




negative beliefs with a theory of bipolar judgments and 
negative facts supports my contention that we witness in 
this transition a decisive stage in Wittgenstein’s expression 
of the theory, which appears first, muffled and alien 
looking, in Russell’s own writings. That is, I suspect that 
Russell’s excessively psychological approach, his inability 
to handle the connection between propositions and 
possible truth values, and to supply a fact when a negative 
proposition is true, together lead Wittgenstein to demand 
bipolarity and Russell to adopt it. For clearly Wittgenstein 
sways Russell, in 1913, further away from a psychological 
account of propositions, towards a logical, bi-polar con-
ception--that is, one which sees propositions in terms of 
their possible truth-values – and towards admission of 
some fact as the meaning of true negative propositions. 
3. A rough solution and a new view 
Turning to the notes, we see Wittgenstein’s hand first in 
Russell’s attempt to address the notion of possibility. 
Russell opens the notes asserting that what is the case 
may be either positive or negative; that “[t]hree objects x, 
R, y form one or other of two complexes xRy or ~xRy” 
(Eames 1984, 195). These negative and positive facts, as 
he thereafter calls them, are said to “contain nothing but x 
and R and y”; that is, despite the suggestion of the symbol 
“~xRy”, a negative fact contains no object corresponding to 
the tilde. Yet they do contain a non-negative, non-positive 
neutral fact as a constituent. He explains: 
It looks as if there actually were always a relation of x 
and R and y whenever they form either of the two com-
plexes, and as if this were perceived in understanding.
 
If 
there is such a neutral [neither positive nor negative] 
fact, it ought to be a constituent of the positive or nega-
tive fact. It will provide a meaning for possibility (Eames 
1984, 195). 
A neutral fact is intended to do the work of propositional 
content, of what is common to the two poles of belief. Thus 
Russell situates the neutral fact in a polarized role in 
judging, introducing a radically new theory of judging which 
overturns that presented in the Theory of Knowledge. 
(Russell is explicit that the neutral fact replaces the notion 
of form treated as an element of belief on the earlier 1913 
theory.) We read: 
Judgment involves the neutral fact, not the positive or 
negative fact. The neutral fact has a relation to a positive 
fact, or to a negative fact. Judgment asserts one of 
these. It [judgment] will still [when it asserts a neutral 
fact in one of these ways] be a neutral relation, but its 
terms will not be the same as in my old theory. The 
neutral fact replaces the form. Call [a] neutral fact “posi-
tively directed” when it corresponds to a positive fact”, 
“negatively directed” when it corresponds to a negative 
fact (Eames 1984, 187).  
In the passage just cited, Russell distinguishes between 
what a judgment involves and what it asserts. (These 
ideas develop eventually into his distinction in late 1918 
between what a propositional symbol expresses--a 
thought, its meaning--and what it asserts or denies: a fact, 
its objective.) Wittgenstein’s insistence that belief be 
construed neither as a relation to a fact (as it would be 
true) nor to a proposition (as there are none), and that a 
proposition must be true because of some fact, expresses 
itself here, I claim, in Russell’s conceding a duality in facts 
(not in belief/disbelief pairs), as well as duality or polarity in 
the way that a proposition (a neutral fact) means. 
That is, we should gather from the 1913 notes how 
decisively Wittgenstein insists on the need for a fact, not a 
subjective mental state, as the correlate of a proposition. 
For it is the point in time at which Russell replaces his 
Theory of Knowledge doctrine on which the negation of 
“aRb” is defined in terms of the occurrence of disbelief. 
Thus when Russell lays down what it means for a judg-
ment to be positive or negative (in order to define the 
conditions under which a judgment is true) he writes:  
The negative of the positive or negative fact is the nega-
tive or positive fact. There is no negative of the neutral 
proposition or of the neutral fact. Call +J(xRy) the judg-
ment of +xRy, etc. Then the negative of a judgment is the 
judgment of the negative (Eames 1984, 199).  
Russell’s earlier treatment of ~ p as disbelief in p, I 
suggested above, made truth and falsity overly psycho-
logical. On the basis of his new conviction that a proposi-
tion must be true or false due to some fact, Russell 
therefore presents his new theory of judging on which truth 
is defined in terms of the existence of a positive or nega-
tive fact. At the same time, he attempts to accommodate 
Wittgenstein and to provide more than just the objective or 
fact – i.e. more than just what makes the judgment true – 
by placing something like content, the neutral relation, in a 
bi-polar relation to the negative or positive fact. Many of 
these trends are brought by Russell to fruition only in the 
teens and twenties; as I have tried to show, they had a 
very long period of incubation and an intimate link to 
Wittgenstein.  
4. A final word:  
looking back to the beginning 
As many now know, on May 20, 1913 Wittgenstein visited 
Russell with a “refutation” of a theory of judgment which 
Russell, says, he “used to hold” (Eames 1984, xxvii). Since 
by that date Russell has already experimented with several 
versions of his (multiple relation) theory of judgment--
versions of it date from 1906, 1910, and 1912 – we might 
well wonder which version Wittgenstein refuted on May 
20th and why. It is often assumed that Wittgenstein is 
referring to Russell’s 1910 theory of belief (Griffin 1985, 
227- 228). Griffin, e.g., points out the parallels between 
Wittgenstein’s remark in the Notebooks that the subordi-
nate relation in the theory of judgment is not a substantive 
and Russell’s 1918 admission that “the theory of judgment 
which I set forth in print some years ago was a little simple, 
because I then did treat the object verb as if one could put 
it as just an object like the terms...” (Slater 1986, 199). 
Griffin then links these remarks to Russell’s 1917 note to 
his 1910 Theory (in “On the Nature of Truth and False-
hood”) that “I have been persuaded by Mr. Wittgenstein 
that this theory is somewhat unduly simple”.  
I argue against Griffin that Wittgenstein probably ob-
jected especially to Russell's 1912 version. (Some external 
reasons can be adduced: On May 7, 1913, Wittgenstein 
expressed “shock” to discover that Russell is writing a 
book of epistemology, apparently assuming that any such 
text would be like the Problems of Philosophy “which” 
(according to Russell) “he hates.” (Eames. 1984, xxvii). 
Given this fact, it is plausible that on May 20th Wittgen-
stein, who is already critical of Russell’s theory of belief in 
the Problems, is again referring to it when he visits.) Why? 
On the 1910 theory a subordinate relation (such as loves) 
distinguishes, e.g., between “a loves b” and “b loves a”, 
but on the 1912 theory judging is responsible for such 
differences of sense. Unlike the 1910 version, on the 1912 
theory psychological "relations" organize and “cement” 
things of various types into a significant whole (Russell 
1912, 128).  




In light of Wittgenstein’s insistence that whatever con-
cerns the fact of believing is not relevant to the proposition 
(my point 1, above), I suggest that on May 20, Wittgenstein 
objected to the 1912 theory as too psychological, as not 
grasping that understanding a proposition (as true or false) 
precedes judgment and thus failing to bring in the whole 
proposition.  
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